Added
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif
to the beginning of all source files that didn't have it.
This ensures that configuration options are respected in all source
files. In particular, it ensures that the defines needed to fix Large
File System issues are set before including system headers.
More generally, it ensures consistency between the source files, and
avoids the possibility of ODR violations between source files that were
including config.h and source files that were not.
Process:
Ran
find . \( -name third_party -prune \) -o \( -name '.git*' -prune \) -o \( \( -name '*.cc' -o -name '*.c' \) -exec sed -i '0,/^#include/ s/^#include/#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H\n#include <config.h> \/\/ Must come first\n#endif\n\n#include/' {} + \)
and then manually fixed up src/common/linux/guid_creator.cc,
src/tools/solaris/dump_syms/testdata/dump_syms_regtest.cc,
src/tools/windows/dump_syms/testdata/dump_syms_regtest.cc,
src/common/stabs_reader.h, and src/common/linux/breakpad_getcontext.h.
BUG=google-breakpad:877
Fixed: google-breakpad:877
TEST=./configure && make && make check
TEST=Did the find/sed in ChromeOS's copy, ensured emerge-hana google-breakpad
worked and had fewer LFS violations.
TEST=Did the find/sed in Chrome's copy, ensured compiling hana, windows, linux, and
eve still worked (since Chrome doesn't used config.h)
Change-Id: I16cededbba0ea0c28e919b13243e35300999e799
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/4289676
Reviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
This extracts the existing objdump-based disassembler engine used in
ExploitabilityLinux into a seperate reusable class, and adds support
for most common address operand formats.
This is a precursor to using DisassemblerObjdump to handle address
resolution for non-canonical address dereferences on amd64.
Bug: 901847
Change-Id: I1a06a86fc2e7c76b4d0e79eca5f8a6c501379f47
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/3720740
Reviewed-by: Ivan Penkov <ivanpe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivan Penkov <ivanpe@chromium.org>
sed -i '' -E -e 's/Copyright (\(c\) )?([0-9-]+),? (Google|The Chromium Authors).*(\r)?$/Copyright \2 Google LLC\4/' -e '/^((\/\/|#| \*) )?All rights reserved\.?\r?$/d' -e 's/name of Google Inc\. nor the/name of Google LLC nor the/' -e 's/POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE$/POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE./' $(git grep -El 'Copyright (\(c\) )?([0-9-]+),? (Google|The Chromium Authors).*$')
Plus manual fixes for src/processor/disassembler_x86.{cc,h}.
Plus some conversions from CRLF to LF line endings in .cc and .h files.
Bug: chromium:1098010
Change-Id: I8030e804eecd9f5a1ec9d66ae166efd8418c2a67
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/3878302
Reviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
On ARM, this write fails to build:
comparison of integers of different signs: 'ssize_t' (aka 'int') and
'const unsigned int' [-Werror,-Wsign-compare]
Since we check that it's <= 15 above, we can simply cast it without
issue.
Bug: b:235999011
Change-Id: Id75fc0df74e88b347df615df06567e96c6b59a1d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/3758800
Reviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
exploitability_linux assumed a 15 byte buffer to always be passed in as
`raw_bytes` for `DisassembleBytes`. This test was passing in a 6 byte
buffer. Make `DisassembleBytes` accept a length.
Bug: b:235999011
Change-Id: I696c66357faa1c7d762c64009864123897f03488
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/3756170
Reviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
We do this in a lot of places, but we're inconsistent.
Normalize the code to the Google C++ style guide.
Change-Id: Ic2aceab661ce8f6b993dda21b1cdf5d2198dcbbf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/breakpad/breakpad/+/2262932
Reviewed-by: Sterling Augustine <saugustine@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Mentovai <mark@chromium.org>
instead of a specific name.
This will prevent false positives on systems which use a format such as
“[stack:69616]” for stack memory mapping names.
Change-Id: I51aeda2fe856c1f37f0d18ac06cce69fec2fffa2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/377086
Reviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
If a crash occurred as a result to a write to unwritable memory, it is reason
to suggest exploitability. The processor checks for a bad write by
disassembling the command that caused the crash by piping the raw bytes near
the instruction pointer through objdump. This allows the processor to see if
the instruction that caused the crash is a write to memory and where the
target of the address is located.
R=ivanpe@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1273823004
git-svn-id: http://google-breakpad.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@1497 4c0a9323-5329-0410-9bdc-e9ce6186880e
when checking exploitability rating.
Linux minidumps do not support MD_MEMORY_INFO_LIST_STREAM, meaning the
processor cannot retrieve its memory mappings. However, it has its own
stream, MD_LINUX_MAPS, which contains memory mappings specific to Linux
(it contains the contents of /proc/self/maps). This CL allows the minidump
to gather information from the memory mappings for Linux minidumps.
In addition, exploitability rating for Linux dumps now use memory mappings
instead of checking the ELF headers of binaries. The basis for the change
is that checking the ELF headers requires the minidumps to store the memory
from the ELF headers, while the memory mapping data is already present,
meaning the size of a minidump will be unchanged.
As a result, of removing ELF header analysis, two unit tests have been removed.
Arguably, the cases that those unit tests check do not merit a high
exploitability rating and do not warrant a solid conclusion that was given
earlier.
R=ivanpe@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1251593007
git-svn-id: http://google-breakpad.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@1476 4c0a9323-5329-0410-9bdc-e9ce6186880e
If the minidump module containing the instruction pointer has memory
containing the ELF header and program header table, when checking the
exploitability rating, the processor will use the ELF header data to determine
if the instruction pointer lies in an executable region of the module, rather
than just checking if it lies in a module.
R=ivanpe@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1233973002
git-svn-id: http://google-breakpad.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@1472 4c0a9323-5329-0410-9bdc-e9ce6186880e
When I first added the exception whitelist, I meant to put the check before
checking the location of the instruction pointer. (I didn't notice that it
was after the other check until now.) The whitelist check is to quickly rule
out minidumps, and if checking the instruction pointer provided any useful
information, it would be pretty indicative that the exception causing the
dump is interesting.
R=ivanpe@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1211253009
git-svn-id: http://google-breakpad.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@1469 4c0a9323-5329-0410-9bdc-e9ce6186880e
in valid code for Linux exploitability rating.
This CL adds to the Linux exploitability checker by verifying that the
instruction pointer is in valid code. Verification is done by obtaining a
memory mapping of the crash and checking if the instruction pointer lies in
an executable region. If there is no memory mapping, the instruction pointer
is checked to determine if it lies within a known module.
R=ivanpe@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1210493003
git-svn-id: http://google-breakpad.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@1464 4c0a9323-5329-0410-9bdc-e9ce6186880e
